Abstract: This paper investigates determinants and consequences of net asset value discounts in listed private equity funds. Listed private equity funds share characteristics of closed-end mutual funds and traditional unlisted private equity funds and can therefore offer insights into both. Our results have particular relevance to the pricing of unlisted private equity funds where no market prices are observable. We find that funds start at an initial premium of -2.5 % and adapt to the long-term average of -21 % after two years. Fund returns display a new and puzzling U-shaped seasonality and an exceptionally weak stock performance in buyout funds after their initial public offering. Premia predict future returns and are explained by liquidity but not by investor sentiment or the fund's investment degree. Private equity fund premia seem to depend on credit markets and systematic risk. This relation suggests that some information about the fund's portfolio is not reflected in net asset values.
Introduction
Since the emergence of exchange traded private equity 1 funds (listed private equity, LPE)
as an asset class in the 1990's, these vehicles have constantly been trading at a discount to their respective net asset value (NAV). If listed private equity funds were similar to holding companies, they should trade at a premium on average. Historically, book-to-market ratios in stocks have been well below one (see, for example, Loughran (1997) and Kothari and Shanken (1997) ). This translates into an average NAV premium for stocks, not into a discount. One can also view listed private equity funds as traded portfolios of unlisted companies. If this was the correct perspective, these funds would be more similar to mutual funds which also represent a portfolio, albeit of securities instead of unlisted shares. The cross-sectional average NAV discount in closed-end mutual funds is almost always positive and has been moving in the range between 5 % and 15 % over the past 20 years. (Cherkes et al. (2008) , Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) . During the same time, listed private equity funds showed an average discount to NAV of about 15 %.
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of discounts in listed private equity funds. We will refer to the ratio of market value to the fund's net asset value as its "premium", since this is the consensus in the closed-end fund literature. The importance of listed private equity funds is that they bridge the gap between closed-end mutual funds, unlisted private equity funds and listed holding companies. It is thus not immediately clear which theories apply. If premia could be successfully explained, our results would have implications for the pricing of private equity funds and in particular secondary transactions, since there are usually no market prices observable for traditional private equity funds.
We find many similarities between premia in listed private equity funds and closed-end funds but also several striking differences. LPE funds do not start with a premium like closed-end mutual funds but show a negative premium of -2.5 % instead. This premium takes about 2 years to adjust to the long-term average of -21 %. This behavior is very 1 We use the term "private equity" to refer to venture capital funds and buyout funds similar to traditional private equity funds. Premia predict future stock returns, what we interpret as mean reversion following Pontiff (1995) . We document a new and puzzling U-shaped seasonality in fund returns with higher-than-average returns in the first quarter and lower returns in the second and third. This pattern cannot be explained by the usual arguments involving tax effects to account for the January effect.
The drop in NAV premia during the first two years cannot be explained directly by economic causes. One likely reason why we observe decreasing premia is a market mechanism when participants learn about management ability, as proposed by Berk and Stanton (2007) .
We find a positive relation between the fund's bid-ask spread and premia, but little evidence for investor sentiment. Surprisingly, infrequently traded funds have exceptionally high premia. Private equity fund valuations seem to depend on credit markets, since premia are inversely related to the long-term credit spread between government and corporate bonds.
Moreover, premia are higher in funds with low systematic risk, which suggests that systematic risk is not fully reflected in net asset values. Another new effect in listed private equity funds is the apparent underperformance of buyout funds following their IPO. Buyout funds exhibit premia that are 8-10 % lower than premia in other funds, which is almost entirely attributable to poor stock performance over their first few years of trading.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review theories explaining fund premia and account for the specifics of private equity funds. We motivate the empirical analysis by combining theories from the closed-end fund literature with empirical phenomena in private equity funds. In section 3, we provide detailed information on private equity net asset values and variables used to estimates premia. In Section 4, we discuss the results on the predictability of fund returns and fund premia and their implications. Section 5 contains a summary and conclusions.
Premia in (private equity) funds
There are several theories that try to explain the difference between NAV and market price of a listed fund. On one hand, the extant literature focuses on closed-end funds that invest in securities. The description as a "closed-end fund puzzle" in the literature highlights the difficulty of investigating NAV premia in these vehicles. On the other hand, there are private equity-specific explanations, which take account of the fact that private equity funds invest in unlisted companies.
The closed-end fund puzzle
Most of the theories dealing with NAV premia concern closed-end mutual funds, which invest only in securities. The fact that these funds are traded at premia to NAV is even more surprising, since such premia should be eliminated by arbitrage in perfect markets. as a whole, the fund price rises and the discount vanishes (Brauer (1984) , Brickley and Schallheim (1985) , Kadapakkam et al. (2005) ). We discuss the relevant theories trying to explain the closed-end fund puzzle and highlight the similarities to listed private equity.
Management fees
Several scholars have proposed theories why management fees of a fund should correlate with NAV premia. Their results are, nevertheless, contradictory. Boudreaux (1973) argues that fees might imply a NAV discount, if the fund's charges are too high. Malkiel (1977) finds no significant relationship between fund returns or NAV premium and fees. Ammer (1990) , however, shows that the fees usually charged by UK funds explain the discounts well. His model is criticized by Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) , because it neither explains the variance of NAV premia in different types of closed-end funds nor the variance in different countries. Lee et al. (1991) (1977) . Taking account of control variables, they find a significant correlation between NAV premia and fees. The small part of total variance explained by their regression suggests that there may be other determining factors.
Management fees in private equity funds are usually determined as a fixed percentage of net assets as well. All arguments put forward to explain closed-end mutual fund premia should therefore carry over to private equity funds.
Managerial ability and performance persistence
The theory of managerial ability posits that many closed-end funds have higher costs than the expertise of investment managers could justify. Shares of those funds should therefore trade at discounts while offering comparably low returns (Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999). Both Malkiel (1977) and Thompson (1978) find no evidence for this hypothesis in their analysis.
Going a step further, this theory suggests that a large NAV discount is followed by low future NAV returns (Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999) . According to Chay (1992) and Chay and Trzcinka (1999) , there is a significant correlation between high discounts and low future NAV returns. Lee et al. (1990) as well as Pontiff (1995) do not find this correlation in their analyses. They demonstrate the opposite, namely that large NAV discounts lead to better future NAV returns. In the most recent model involving managerial ability, Berk and Stanton (2007) argue that discounts change over time as investors change their beliefs about the manager's ability. If managers cannot be fired, poor managerial performance leads to discounts. Premia are short-lived, because managers learn about their above-average performance and negotiate a pay increase.
Taking previous returns as an indicator of the management's skills in closed-end funds, future NAV returns could be inferred from past observed NAV returns. Premia and discounts could be explained by this performance persistence. Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001) analyze British closed-end funds but find no evidence for the existence of performance persistence in their data. Bleaney and Smith (2003) consider the relationship between past returns and NAV premia. They examine closed-end funds in the US and UK that invest either in bonds or stocks. Past returns are shown to have a positive impact on NAV premia, but only in equity funds. The performance persistence explanation should also apply to listed private equity. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , for example, show that it exists at least for traditional non-listed private equity funds.
Private benefits
If closed-end funds can be opened or liquidated, discounts should tend to zero. However, if managers own very little of the fund, they do not benefit substantially from opening the fund, but would run a risk of losing their job. Therefore, managers resist open-ending proposals and discounts persist. Larger managerial stock ownership should lead to an incentive to open the fund and to declining discounts. Barclay et al. (1993) find exactly the opposite relation.
The greater the managerial stock ownership in closed-end funds, the larger are the discounts to net asset value. The average discount for funds with blockholders is 14 %, whereas the average discount for funds without blockholders is only 4 %. They argue that blockholders receive private benefits such as management fees or payments for financial research that do not accrue to other shareholders. Therefore, they veto open-ending proposals to preserve these benefits. The situation in listed private equity funds is somewhat more complicated.
While venture capital trusts generally allow the fund's dissolution by shareholder resolution, shareholder (or unitholder) rights differ in funds with a partnership structure. Limited partners in these funds typically have no right to terminate and dissolve the fund (e. g.
KKR Private Equity Investors)
. We suspect that the legal structure has an influence on private benefits extraction and may interact with the proportion of block ownership.
Tax timing
Following Constantinides (1984) , capital gains tax can be reduced by skillfully timed purchases and sales of shares. According to this theory, investors forgo their chance to minimize taxes through managing their portfolio by investing in externally managed funds. If investors replicate the fund's portfolio instead, they have better control over their tax payments (Kim, 1994) . Brickley et al. (1991) support this theory with their findings. Kim (1994) shows that tax issues have a significant influence on the NAV premium of closed-end funds. Tax timing, however, cannot explain why funds are occasionally traded at a premium. Contrary to investment funds, LPE funds invest in rather illiquid assets that cannot be bought and sold as easily as stocks. The replication argument does not hold, since there is no precise control of tax payments possible.
Country funds and market segmentation
Closed-end funds that invest in a specific country or a particular region outside their home country are called country funds (Charitou et al., 2006) . The theory is that restrictions on direct foreign investment are a possible explanation for NAV premia (Dimson and MinioKozerski, 1999) . Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) test whether there is a correlation between announcements of changes in international investment restrictions and changes in NAV premia.
In four out of five funds they find a reduction in premia whenever a liberalization of investment restrictions is announced. The average premium reduction is 6.8 %. A study by Malkiel (1977), however, shows no significant correlation between the proportion of foreign shares in the fund portfolio and its NAV premium. Country effects cannot explain the up to 100 % premia of country funds which invested in Germany during the reunification, since Germany is a free market without investment barriers (Hardouvelis et al., 1993) . This theory is hardly applicable for listed private equity funds, since private equity funds with an explicit country focus do not exist yet. Nevertheless, the German example shows the overreactions which may occur in the market.
Low sales incentives
Malkiel (1977) points out that investors usually do not buy mutual funds. They are rather sold to investors by brokers, but brokers sell those products that promise the highest commission. Open-end funds usually pay higher commissions. According to Pratt (1966) , this is the reason for an imbalance of sales efforts between open and closed funds. NAV discounts are thus caused by a weaker demand for closed-end funds. Weiss (1989) adds that the higher NAV premium at the moment of listing could be due to higher sales commissions in IPOs of closed-end funds. There is no reason to believe that sales efforts are higher or lower for LPE funds than for other closed-end funds, but the overall effect is hard to measure, since there are no LPE funds comparable to open-end investment funds.
Investor sentiment
Because the previously mentioned theories cannot sufficiently explain NAV discounts, the rationality of the market is called into question. A visible sign of this irrationality could be decreasing NAV discounts in times of bull markets and declining premia when stock prices are falling. Zweig (1973) 
Private equity-related explanations
In addition to explanations focusing on mutual funds and the closed-end fund puzzle, there are several explanations of NAV premia which apply to LPE-specific characteristics. These are the dependence on credit markets in buyout funds, illiquidity of portfolios and listed funds, stale pricing and the J-Curve effect.
Dependency on credit markets
Private equity transactions and predominantly those in the buyout sector typically involve large amounts of debt. Between 1990 and 2006, the average equity contribution in buyout transactions was constantly about 30 % of transaction value (Guo et al., 2008 (2000) and Baker et al. (2003) for public companies. The validity of this argument, however, relies on market frictions which cause a segmentation of debt and equity markets. Axelson et al. (2009) propose a different hypothesis based on the observation that private equity firms pursue large transactions relative to their fund sizes. Private equity firms might be constrained in the amount of equity they can invest in a given deal. Therefore, they must use leverage to fund their investments. Both theories imply a dependence on credit markets.
Based on Kaplan and Stein's (1993) 
Liquidity
Liquidity can play a role on two levels. On one hand, it is important to investigate whether the portfolio companies' liquidity have an influence on the fund's NAV premium. On the other hand, the liquidity of the fund itself might affect premia. Lee et al. (1990) show that the liquidity of the securities the fund holds cannot be responsible for the NAV discount in investment funds, because only a few funds have illiquid securities in their portfolio. LPE funds, however, mostly hold illiquid shares in portfolio companies. Cherkes et al. (2008) find that closed-end funds that hold illiquid securities are traded at higher premia. They justify this by the additional liquidity these funds offer their investors compared to direct investments in these portfolio companies. While the funds's stock is listed on an exchange, shares in the portfolio companies are highly illiquid. Since the illiquidity of an investment is not taken into account when calculating the NAV, investors of such a fund pay an additional liquidity premium. Note that this argument is directly opposed to the arbitrage argument that premia should be lower if the liquidity of the fund's underlying portfolio is high and arbitrage strategies are thus easier to implement. On the fund level, Datar et al. (1998) and Chordia et al. (2001) show that the illiquidity of an investment is generally related to a higher rate of return, as investors want to be compensated for the higher risk in illiquid investments. Many LPE vehicles are rather small and illiquid. Thus, the illiquidity both at the level of the Fund as well as on the level of the portfolio companies might have an impact on NAV premia.
Stale pricing
The quality of net asset values is highly dependent on the choice of parameters and the method used for their calculation. Therefore, a PE fund or the management company can act with relatively high flexibility in pricing those portfolio companies for which there is no market price available (Anson, 2002) . Since many PE firms accept the International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines developed by the industry organizations AFIC, BVCA and EVCA and based on the notion of fair value, valuation methods are largely the same across funds. However, many free parameters can be chosen at the firm's discretion. Many management companies are reluctant to change valuations much in the absence of value-determining events such as a change of ownership. There can be long periods without such events, which can lead to NAVs containing less and less current information.
Whenever the net asset value does not contain all available information, this situation is called stale pricing. This leads to a delay between net asset value and observable market value. Therefore, the NAV will only occasionally coincide with the market value of portfolio companies measured by the hypothesized transaction value on a free market.
An inconsistency of NAV and market value or lagged book values can also be caused by managed pricing (Anson, 2002) . The management company has certain leeway in calculating
NAVs that can be exploited in the way most useful to fund management, that is, fast appreciation and slow depreciation of NAVs to boost performance-related compensation.
Those fair values which are based on international valuation guidelines could be biased due to stale pricing. Since the guidelines advocate rapid depreciation to ensure conservative valuation, managed pricing should rather play a minor role.
Stale pricing and managed pricing are no longer a problem as soon as the portfolio company is sold and the investment is realized by the fund. The final return could be observed at this point in time. Emery (2003) analyzes the quarterly NAV returns by regressing them on stock indices and examines them in terms of its correlation with quarterly returns of stock index returns. He finds a determination coefficient of 35 % when using NASDAQ returns as an independent variable and 56 % when using lagged NASDAQ returns. These results suggest a delay in the adjustment of net asset values to new information about portfolio companies. When using annual rather than quarterly data, the lag effect is less pronounced.
However, Emery does not explore whether the delay is caused by stale pricing or managed pricing.
Anson (2002) finds a similar lag structure between NAV returns and stock index returns.
In addition, he tests whether the delays are attributable to stale pricing or managed pricing.
He examines how fast NAVs appreciate in rising stock markets and depreciate in bear markets. Managed pricing should be indicated by quickly appreciating and slowly depreciating NAVs. He notes that appreciation occurs slower than depreciation, which is in line with the international guidelines on valuation but contrary to NAV-based incentive schemes. Since listed funds employ the same business model as traditional private equity funds and their portfolio companies are valued according to the same standards, results should be similar for listed funds. In listed funds, however, it is possible to construct incentive schemes based on the stock price, which should reduce managed pricing to some extent.
The J-Curve effect
A well established empirical phenomenon is the J-shaped relationship between a fund's age and its lifetime NAV return (see Phalippou and Gottschlag (2009) All these effects also apply to listed private equity with the exception of management fees, where the magnitude of the J-curve is supposedly lower than in traditional PE funds.
Listed funds are usually paid in at once and thus no discrepancy between committed capital and paid-in capital can exist. In efficient stock markets, price changes reflect changes in the expectations of shareholders in net cash flows available for distribution to the shareholders and also in the interest rate used to discount future cash flows. Since the J-Curve effect is well known, it should be taken into account in rational capital markets and should thus have no impact on share price movements. If the fund's NAV shows a J-Curve effect but the share price does not, then NAV discounts should depend on the fund's age. This theory could, if confirmed, explain only a small part of NAV discounts shortly after the fund's IPO and does not explain premia at the IPO or late in the fund's lifetime.
Data and methodology
Net asset values and premia
Fund data were compiled from several sources. Net asset values per share between 1992 and 2008 were collected from the funds' financial reports. Share prices were obtained from
Datastream. Practitioners usually define a fund's premium as the ratio of the fund's price per share to the book value of their portfolio per share minus one. In this paper, we compute premia as the natural logarithm of price to net asset value per share. Since one ratio can be transformed into the other, we do not lose information but are able to specify regression models correctly. A fund's premium can be expressed as P REM t = ln(P t /N AV t ) where P t is the fund's price per share and N AV t is defined as the fund's net asset value or, equivalently, book value of equity per share. We were able to collect 1727 premia from 100 funds, not all of which can be analyzed due to missing data on covariates. Our sample comprises 79 ordinary funds and 21 listed private equity funds of funds (FoF) that invest in traditional private equity funds. Since funds of funds turn out to behave similarly to directly investing funds, we do not treat them as special, but address relevant FoF issues below. Most funds Covariates Table 1 reports summary statistics of the net asset value premia and covariates. The average ratio of NAV to market value is 84.2 %, which corresponds to an average premium of -20.7 %.
One NAV below zero is observed but is excluded from further analyses when taking logs.
85.7 % of all premia are below zero, only 3.1 % are greater than 20 %. The average fund age is 6.6 years, which documents the recent growth in this asset class.
[Insert table 1 about here]
• Cash / Total Assets: The funds' cash position and total assets in each quarter are taken from Worldscope and augmented by figures from the funds' financial reports.
We define the cash position as cash and cash equivalents to total assets. We also compute a cash position relative to market capitalization but do not use it to explain premia. Since most of this measure's variation is due to changes in market value, including it in a regression for premia would cause spurious correlation. The average cash position is 11.3 % with a median of 5.8 %. Compared to market value, funds hold 18.0 % cash on average (Median 8.4 %).
• Bid-ask spread (Log): Bid-ask spreads are calculated for each fund as its share price's bid-ask spread averaged over each quarter. The average bid-ask spread is 2 %. Two implausible negative values could not be verified, but are excluded when taking logs.
• Trading days (Log): In each quarter, we count the number of days Datastream reports a trading volume for and take its natural log. The average number of trading days is 41, but most funds traded on 56 or more days each quarter. The variable that enters the regression is the percentage of trading days in each quarter in logs.
• Age (Log): At the end of each quarter, each fund's age is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of years from its IPO date.
• • Beta: Systematic risk is estimated by a time-series regression with Dimson (1979) betas. We use this variable to proxy for systematic business risk associated with portfolio companies. Based on the international Capital Asset Pricing Model, the equation for the regression is given by
Beta is the sum of β k . R t and M t−k are the respective observed logarithmic (excess) index and market returns at time t and t-k, whereas k corresponds to the respective lag, α, β and γ are the slope coefficients and ǫ t is an error term. Asset and market returns are in US dollars. We include seven lagged market returns, since this number of lags turns out to be statistically significant for equally weighted indices of listed private equity (see Lahr and Herschke (2009) ). GBP , EU R and JP Y are the weekly log returns of currency portfolios to account for exchange rate fluctuations and movements in local interest rates. They are constructed as (excess) returns on short-term deposits denominated in local currency and measured in the reference currency. All returns are continuously compounded. Since market return autocorrelations are relatively small compared to autocorrelations in our LPE indices, we exclude leading market returns to avoid look-ahead bias. The risk-free rate of return was estimated by averaging the monthly averages of three month Treasury bill returns over the observed period and taking logs.
• Management fee: Private equity funds usually charge two types of fees. Management fees typically are a fixed percentage of NAV whereas performance-related fees can depend on income or capital gains. Performance fees of 20 % of NAV gains combined with an 8 % hurdle rate are most common in our sample. Since different performance fee provisions across funds cannot easily be concentrated in one variable, we choose to retain only nominal management fees as a covarite. Management fees range from 0.4 % to 3.5 %. The median fee is 1.8 %.
• Market and small cap indices: The concurrent quarterly MSCI World index return is used to control for the market risk factor in the equity market. To test the investor sentiment theory, the FTSE Small Cap, DJ Stoxx Small and MSCI US Small Cap index returns are included for the UK, Europe and the US, respectively.
• Change in commitments: Cash inflows of private equity funds may well indicate hot markets according to the money-chasing-deals argument (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) and therefore influence premia. We obtain quarterly worldwide fund commitments from Thomson VentureXpert to measure the change in fund commitments.
• Interest rates and spread: We decompose long-term interest rates on corporate debt into 10-year government bond yield and the spread between long-term government and corporate bonds. UK and US interest rates are represented by their respective government bond yield, continental European interest rates are approximated by German 10-year benchmark bond yields.
• Fund focus: To account for possibly different business risk and organizational structures, we separate funds according to their stage focus. We only distinguish between venture funds (41) and buyout funds (38) because of the limited number of funds. The 21 funds of funds in our sample constitute a third category.
Estimation
Net asset value premia in listed private equity funds show considerable autocorrelation at lag one. We therefore employ estimation techniques that account for this autocorrelation.
Returns in tables 3 and 6 are estimated by pooled OLS with inference using Newey-West standard errors. A more direct method to deal with autocorrelation is to adjust the variables previous to the estimation, which is done in tables 4 and 7. Variables are first purged of first-order autocorrelation by a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. After that, we use the GLS method by Baltagi and Wu (1999) to handle unbalanced panel data. To identify coefficients for variables that are constant within each panel, the Baltagi and Wu random effects estimator is employed. We also report fixed effects estimates for comparison for some models. All random effects models in table 7 are consistent as indicated by insignificant
Hausman tests.
Collinearity among independent variables can make it hard to assign effects to specific variables. Spurious significance or no significance at all could be the result of negatively or positively correlated variables, respectively. There is a large amount of common variation among the market index returns, interest rates, and (lagged) interest spreads. We try to overcome these issues by also performing factor analyses on the first two groups of variables and using the common factor in regressions instead. Co-movements in interest spreads, which is mainly induced by including lagged variables, is less of a problem, since coefficients in our results mostly have the same sign and are significant despite their high degree of positive correlation. However, we opt to err on the side of caution and exclude all spread variables but the concurrent and lagged UK spread.
Empirical results
We record the first observation for one fund two days after its IPO. The average premium for this day is -2.58 %. If we extrapolate linearly from this first observation, the IPO premium is -2.5 % (see table 2 and figure 2). This is considerably less than the premia reported for UK and US closed-end funds. The average investment trust issue is quoted at the end of the first day of trading at an effective premium of 5.72 % above its net asset value (Levis and Thomas, 1995). US stocks still trade at 4.8 % premium 5 weeks after the IPO (Weiss, 1989) . Considering an initial return of -6.478 % over the first 30 days, as reported by Weiss (1989) , US stocks sell at an even higher premium. According to Lee et al. (1991) , first day premia are generally attributed to investor sentiment, which issuing firms are able to use to their advantage. If first day premia occur in hot issue markets because of positive investor sentiment, we observe less irrational behavior in listed private equity funds.
[Insert figure 2 about here]
After the first slightly negative premium on the first trading day, premia decrease to the long-run average of -22 %. The drop in premia is fairly linear and reaches its bottom after 2-2.5 years, as depicted in figure 3 . Weiss (1989) finds that within 24 weeks of trading, closed-end equity funds in the US trade at a significant average discount of 10.02 %. Levis and Thomas (1995) find that after 200 trading days, equity funds in the UK fall in value by 5 %. The qualitative behavior of premia is thus very similar to closed-end funds but displays a time pattern like in traditional private equity funds where returns measured by IRRs usually turn around after 2-3 years and break even after 5-6 years. However, the pattern is actually reversed compared to what we should expect if the J-curve phenomenon was driving premia. If NAV returns were low over the first quarters but shares earned some risk-adjusted return, premia should rise first and then remain at an equilibrium. We find no correlation between NAV returns and age but higher stock returns in older funds. This suggests that the age effect is driven by stock returns rather than net asset values. One explanation in the spirit of Berk and Stanton (2007) is that the market needs more time to learn about the management's quality. This argument works for private equity funds, since it takes longer to invest the IPO proceeds than in closed-end mutual funds. It also implies that management ability can be assessed based on the acquisitions during this initial investment period rather than the portfolio's subsequent performance. Consistent with this explanation, premia in venture capital funds take about four years to settle whereas premia in buyout funds and funds of funds reach their long-range average two years after their IPO.
[Insert figure 3 
Return predictability
Listed private equity NAV premia predict future stock performance in almost all of our subsamples (see tables 3 and 4). The negative relation is stable across different specifications and independent from the Fama-French HML factor.
In rational markets, sensitivity of returns to book-to-market ratios represents some financial risk associated with high (or low) book-to-market firms. The book-to-market effect is a well documented phenomenon across different markets. Fama and French (1992 ) document a strong positive relation between average returns and book-to-market equity. Empirical studies find that book-to-market ratios are inversely related to future firm performance (Fama and French (2004) , Fama and French (1995) ) and growth (Lakonishok et al., 1994) and are positively related to leverage (Chen and Zhang, 1998) . Petkova and Zhang (2005) show that the value premium itself tends to covary positively with the expected market risk premium. These results suggest that high book-to-market firms are more financially distressed than low book-to-market firms, and therefore at least some of the documented stock performance is an artifact of expected returns for financial risk factors (Piotroski, 2007) .
Contrary to these explanations, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the subsequent returns to the book-to-market strategy represent a reversal of past valuation errors. The predominant finding in closed-end funds is a negative correlation between fund premia and future returns, which is the opposite of the negative relation between book-to-market ratios and returns. Pontiff (1995) finds that funds with 20 % discounts have expected twelve-month returns that are 6 % greater than nondiscounted funds (0.7 % per month). Thompson (1978) finds that annual contrarian strategies based on this finding yield abnormal risk-adjusted returns of about 4 % per year. Pontiff (1995) attributes this correlation to premium meanreversion, not to anticipated future portfolio performance. Economically motivated explanations such as bid-ask spread or tax considerations do not account for this effect.
[Insert Fund returns can be explained by the book-to-market factor but also by past premia. Funds trading at a 20 % discount yield a quarterly return 3 % higher than those without such a premium. The effect is least in buyout funds and most pronounced in funds of funds. Since returns are autocorrelated at lag one (p < 0.05), we perform the same regressions on adjusted variables and find similar results for all sub-samples (see table 4 ).
[Insert Additionally, we observe a U-shaped seasonal pattern in returns. Quarterly returns are highest in the first quarter and lowest in the second and third (see table 3 ). This would be a direct violation of market efficiency if no economic cause were to be found. In a three-factor CAPM world, the January effect in returns should disappear, if returns are regressed on risk factors that also show this effect (Fama and French, 1992) . This is not the case in our data. The seasonality is robust to alternative model specifications as shown in tables 4 and 5. Explanations of this "January effect", which are put forward in the literature, are mostly tax-related. Pontiff (1995) argues that different taxation of dividends and capital gains can cause a transitional effect on returns and premia. When stocks go ex-dividend, their prices fall by an amount less than the dividend. This affects both the fund and its portfolio. In periods in which a fund collects dividends on its portfolio, its premium decreases, because its net asset value increases. When the fund passes on these dividends to its shareholders, its stock will decrease less than the drop in NAV, thus increasing the premium. There are several difficulties with this argument in the context of listed private equity funds. First, higher NAV returns in periods when the fund is collecting dividends depend on the fund's ability to revalue its portfolio according to the difference between dividends received and the change of the portfolio company's share price. This can be difficult if there is no market price for portfolio companies, as is the case with private equity funds. In a regression similar to the ones shown in table 3, we do not find a seasonality in NAV returns. Second, dividends would have to be simply too large to account for the difference in returns, which is about 6 % between the first and second quarter.
The second explanation could be tax-loss-selling. This theory holds that at the end of the year, investors sell stocks which have experienced losses to realize these losses and thereby reduce their taxable income. Brauer and Chang (1990) document a "January effect" in closed-end funds, which they interpret as evidence of tax-loss selling. They show that fund prices increase in January, although their net asset values do not. We also find significantly higher January returns in listed private equity funds. However, tax-loss-selling does not account for the surprisingly low returns in the second quarter. We can therefore only speculate about the causes of this seasonality.
Determinants of listed private equity premia
The age effect found in the descriptive analysis is also present if covariates are taken into account. During the first year after the IPO, funds show a 10.1 % above-average premium which declines to 5.6 % above the long-term average in the second year. This two-year adaptation period might be caused by the long investment period of private equity funds, which go public with a portfolio consisting almost entirely of cash that is invested in portfolio companies over time. Cash levels can therefore act as a proxy for the fund's investment degree. There is, however, no such effect in our data (see model 3 in table 7). If we construct a cash ratio based on market value instead of total assets, we find a negative relation between cash and premia where there should be a positive one. Since market value enters the equation on both sides, the effect is likely caused by endogeneity. This unexplained age effect therefore lends support to the management ability hypothesis by Berk and Stanton (2007) .
Pontiff (1995) finds a positive relation between bid-ask spreads and expected returns, which is dominated by the even stronger ability of premia to predict returns. This effect of both variables predicting returns could be the result of collinearity between premia and bidask spreads, which is indicated by our results in table 7. If low premia represent financial risk that is only in part explained by bid-ask spread, premia could be a more reliable predictor of returns than bid-ask spreads. However, bid-ask spreads could still be the economic cause of premia, as we propose here. This direction of causality seems more plausible than a causation of bid-ask spread by premia or by a third unobserved variable.
[Insert table 7 about here]
As another proxy for liquidity, we include in our analysis the percentage of active trading days within each quarter. The expected relation is positive, if illiquidity causes discounts.
However, we find a negative relation across all model specifications. Although bid-ask ratios is only partially significant (p = 0.071). We do not find a reasonable explanation for this negative effect of trading activity within our dataset, which suggests that there might be an unobserved variable driving this result.
Interest rates have a mixed effect on premia, whereas the yield spread between government and corporate debt contributes inversely to NAV premia. We observe a negative relation between US and UK long term interest rates and premia, but a positive one for the continental European interest rate. If the latter is dropped from the model, the loss in overall R 2 is less than 0.005, but the US interest rate is not significant anymore. Since there is a high degree of collinearity between interest rates, their common variation can be used to construct a replacement variable by factor analysis. When used instead of individual interest rates, the interest factor becomes insignificant (see table 8 ). The overall interest rate level therefore does not seem to influence net asset value premia.
[Insert table 8 about here]
The effect of yield spread on premia is consistently negative. 2 This result could imply that changes in spreads have a stronger influence on market prices than on net asset values. Pontiff and Schall (1998) provide an explanation built on arguments put forward by Ball (1978) and Berk (1995) . Berk reminds us that a firm's market value does not cause its capital cost to be high but that rising discount rates lead to a lower lower market capitalization.
Pontiff and Schall argue that book value proxies for future cash flows and therefore dividing a cash flow proxy by a concurrent market price produces a variable that is correlated with future returns. This is because dividing an expected cash flow proxy (net asset calues in our case) by a price level (market value) yields a discount rate proxy. This approach is very general, since it holds whether or not discount rates are generated by a specific model or are influenced by stochastic or irrational factors. However, the explanation by Pontiff and Schall depends on the ability of book value to proxy for cash flow. Turning this argument around, the common variation in premia and yield spread in our results supports the hypothesis that book value proxies for cash flow.
It seems to be the difference in yield between corporate debt and government debt that Moreover, we document an inverse relation between premia and systematic risk, represented by Dimson beta in an international capital asset pricing model. Since portfolio betas are just the weighted sum of its assets' betas, net asset values and fund prices should move together. The difference between the two should therefore not depend on systematic risk.
The effect we observe in our data is suggestive of mispricing of net asset values or fund prices.
The former is more likely because of the management's discretionary power when estimating net asset values. For high-beta funds, net asset values seem too high, and vice versa.
Investor sentiment as an explanation for premia plays a dominant role in the literature on closed-end fund discounts. IPO premia and rising premia in hot markets as well as a general discount on closed-end funds are all attributed to the presence of irrational investors. Except for an average discount similar to the one in closed-end mutual funds, we find no evidence for investor sentiment in listed private equity funds. While UK and US funds are issued at a premium, the average premium in our sample is negative. Small capitalization indices have no individual power in explaining premia. A factor constructed from the three smallcap indices is, however, significantly but negatively correlated with premia. At the same time, the market index becomes significant with the opposite sign, which is an indication of collinearity (ρ = 0.63). If the market index and the small-cap indices are used to form a market factor, this factor has a small but significant coefficient (b = −0.14, p < 0.01).
Small-cap indices thus do not suggest the presence of investor sentiment in listed private equity funds.
We use the change in commitments to private equity funds as a proxy for hot markets, but its coefficient is far from being significant. The number of private equity-backed IPOs, as reported by Thomson VentureXpert, does not become significant either. In line with the arguments by Lee et al. (1991) , we find no correlation between management fees and premia.
Institutional ownership, which might also proxy for noise trader risk, increases premia slightly. The concentration of ownership is similar, but also proxies for the potential of owners to extract private benefits. Although there is some correlation with premia (ρ=0.087, p<0.01), we only find a weak influence on premia in a multivariate context. Both institutional ownership and ownership concentration are only significant predictors of premia, if they are both included in a model, which is due to the high degree of collinearity. A single factor constructed from both variables is not significant as shown in table 8.
Further insights into the nature of fund premia might come from grouping funds according to legal systems. In particular, private benefits could be extracted more easily in some jurisdictions than in others. We use the exchange which a fund's stock is traded on to distinguish between common law and other legal systems. There are 76 funds in common law countries whose premia are about 10 % higher on average. Since there are 25 venture capital trusts in our sample that offer tax advantages, we control for this fact, but find no different results.
[ Insert table 6 about here]
Fund focus shows a surprisingly large effect in our sample. Venture capital funds and funds of funds have premia that are 8-10 % higher than in buyout funds. Could it be that there is less value creation in buyout funds? If funds are issued at net asset value, there must be either a faster appreciation of net asset values in buyout funds or a drop in fund prices after the IPO. Interestingly, buyout funds start with a premium of 3.04 %, whereas venture capital funds and funds of funds are issued at premia of -6.85 % and -6.64 %, respectively. This suggests that buyout fund prices depreciate even faster relative to their NAVs. We perform a regression of fund returns on the usual risk factors and fund age and find a negative abnormal return for the first year (see table 6 ). The sum of the year dummies is significant at the 5 %-level. There is no such effect in venture capital fund or fund of funds returns. It remains a puzzle why investors should be willing to participate in buyout fund IPOs under these circumstances.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of discounts in listed private equity (LPE) funds. LPE funds share characteristics of closed-end mutual funds and traditional unlisted private equity funds and can therefore offer insights into both. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, we test the hypotheses developed to solve the "closed-end fund puzzle" against the newly established LPE asset class. Second, we improve the understanding of premia in traditional private equity funds, whose market prices are typically unobservable.
In contrast to mutual funds, we find that LPE funds do not trade at a premium immediately after their IPO. They start with a negative premium of -2.5 % instead. This premium takes much longer than in mututal funds -over 2 years -to adjust to the long-term average of -21 %. Premia predict future stock returns after controlling for the book-to-market factor.
We interpret the negative correlation as mean reversion following Pontiff (1995) .
A new and puzzling U-shaped seasonality is present in fund returns across different investment styles, which can neither be explained by different taxation of dividends and capital gains nor by tax-loss-selling. We find the weakest stock performance in the second quarter, which, if the tax-loss-selling hypothesis was true, would be observed in the last quarter.
The fund's cash divided by total asset can proxy for its investment degree, but shows no relation to premia. However, we confirm the positive relation between the fund's liquidity, measured by its bid-ask spread, and premia. Surprisingly, infrequently traded funds have exceptionally high premia. We find evidence that some information about the fund's portfolio is not reflected in net asset values but in market prices. Fund valuations depend on the longterm credit spread between government and corporate bonds. Premia are also higher in funds with low systematic risk, which suggests that systematic risk is not fully reflected in net asset values.
Another new effect in listed private equity funds is the apparent under-performance of buyout funds following their IPO. Buyout funds exhibit premia that are 8-10 % lower than premia in other funds, which is almost entirely attributable to poor stock performance over the first few years of the funds' lifetime. These findings suggest that future research on fund premia might benefit from examining the drop in first-year premia and the informational content of private equity net asset values. 0.528*** 0.498*** 0.525*** 0.550*** 0.553*** 0.491*** 0.536*** Small cap factor -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.032*** Interest factor 0.032 0.016 0.037 0.046 0.059** Spread UK -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.022** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.034*** -0.042*** Lag 1 -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.063*** -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.052*** Constant -0.579*** -0.515*** -0.590*** -0.508*** -0.527*** -0.257*** -0.235** 
